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Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality 
But Outside Ethics 
Postmodernism and Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth
In those Sophist days before the ‘start’ of the Western Tradition, the 
suspicion that the finite and the contingent was all that there was; the idea 
that the phenom enal world was the only actual world; the understanding 
that the basis for living finite lives was the aleatory and the ludic, led to 
attitudes and  theorisations expressed in varieties o f ontological, episte­
mological and ethical relativisms vis a vis the significances and meanings 
conferred on the ‘metaphysics of existence’. Andwhynot? If from the ‘facts’ 
o f the  ‘ev id en ce’ no non-con tingen t, absolute ‘o u g h t’ unequivocally 
em erged, if individual and political life -  past, present and future -  seemed 
in terpetable interm inably (you can talk about politics forever...); if there 
seem ed no rhyme nor reason to anything or anybody in themselves (indeed, 
if it was realised that the ‘secret’ of the essence of the ‘thing in itself was that 
there was no such essence) then no other viable conclusion seemed available 
other than a relativistic ‘anything goes’ coupled with the ultimate acceptance 
of the idea that ‘m ight is r ig h t’. Consequently it is here, against these 
conclusions, that the Western Tradition begins; in the refusal, by Plato, to 
see sophist scepticism and relativism not as solutions to the problem of the 
finite, the contingent and the aleatory (a way to live with these actualities, to 
put your feet up and be relaxed about them) but rather as continuing problems 
(seen now precisely as ‘the problems of scepticism and relativism’) still to 
be solved. A ccordingly, because sophists and , la te r  and  differently, 
pyrrhonists and o ther sceptical solutions for living life ‘here and now’ were 
n o t deem ed to be solutions at all, so the finite world -  whose anti-logic 
articulations Plato well recognised as providing no basis for anything other 
than various relativisms -  had to be supplem ented/supplanted by something 
‘beyond the reach of time and chance’, an ‘infinitive fix’ to bring tem porary/ 
tem poral chaos into perm anent and absolute order. Living in the shadows 
of Plato, the history of the Western Tradition has thus overwhelmingly been 
the history of various articulations of this apparently necessary, stabilising 
fantasy -  this infinite fix -  in the guise of eternal verities expressed either in 
the anglicised upper case (Forms, God, Essence, Nature, Hum an Nature, 
The Categorical Imperative, Spirit, Class Struggle, Dialectic, Market Forces, 
Reason, History...) a n d /o r  in older linguistic expressions all suggesting
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immanence and centerings that had an invariable presence: eidos, arche, telos, 
energeia ousia etc., imaginaries all bearing down upon us wearing the insignia 
of Truth.1
It is a curious fact, but a fact nevertheless, that such a variety of infinite 
fixes was not immediately regarded with widespread incredulity (as opposed 
to local, marginalised and shadowy scepticisms and relativisms -  critiques 
overwhelmingly recuperated by the dom inant tradition to be construed as 
its ever-threatening ‘o ther’) . One m ight have thought that the very fact that, 
‘historically speaking’,there have been so many expressions of such upper 
case demards, would have made people immediately consider such eternal 
imperatives as mere reified projections of their own interpretive (relative) 
desires and that to obey such chimeras was to chase themselves back into 
their own logically tautological and solipsistic lairs. But again, historically 
speaking, this fact -  of one thing to be expressed but so many narrative/ 
metanarrative expressions -  seems only to have convinced adherents of them  
that, strange though it may seem, their own preferred  interpretations were 
not really interpretations at all but the Truth. Thus we have witnessed -  
restricting ourselves now to fairly recen t historical articulations o f this 
‘existential metaphysic’ though one very obviously based on m uch ‘older 
fram es o f m in d ’ -  various fo u n d a tio n a l progressiv ism s, positivism s, 
Marxisms, Whiggism, Fascisms, etc., m etanarrative fixes ultimately of the 
‘endsjustify the means’ type. To banish the finite and contigent and to turn 
such phenom ena into some kind of dem anding necessity, these formulations 
we have died for.
Contemporary postmodernism is a phase -  however hesitatingly and 
qualifyingly specified as non-teleological, non-stagist, and  as m erely a 
‘different’ moment/condition from an d /o r  after modernity -  postmodernism 
has finally, I think, ended the plausability of such metanarratives. Today 
there seems to be everywhere that incredulity towards them  which Lyotard 
famously essayed: few if any of us believe in such fantasies any more. Through 
the efforts of various linguistic, narrative, deconstructive and discursive turns, 
we now realise that there never has been, and there  never will be, any 
‘know able’ form s, essences, n a tu ra l n a tu res , h isto ries , e tc ., beyond  
contingency. That we will never have access to a founding originary, and 
hence to no inevitable destinations, teleological trajectories o r dialectics of 
closure; that we have no conduit to any kind of extra-discursive transcendental 
signifier, full-presence o r om niscien t n a rra to r /n a rra tiv e . In  fact, we 
postmodernists have now just about unpacked the imaginaries of the non-
1 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference, Routledge, London 1978, p. 289.
214
relativist Western Tradition so that we are effectively ‘back at the beginning’: 
rhetorical neo-sophists. For we /j orf-m o d e r n i s ts are, in an interesting reversal, 
also pre W estern Traditionalists, pre modernists. In a very precise way we 
are now /jre-platonic, pre-christian, ^re-kantian, jfrre-hegelian, //r^marxist, ^re- 
m arket, /»re-fascist, in the sense that these attempts to put us in touch with 
various foundations having failed, then we now have to face -  at the end of 
the W estern Tradition -  the same existential/metaphysical problems the 
sophists faced before it began. Accordingly, we now have the chance to 
consider contemporary takes on sophist-type sceptical and relativistic solutions 
to the m etaphysics o f existence precisely as solutions and no t at all as 
problem s ‘still to be solved’ Such solutions to fmiteness and the endless 
equivalences o f anti-logic may not be the same type of solutions as Plato’s or 
K ant’s o r M arx’s or contem porary  ‘certaintists’, bu t they are solutions 
nevertheless - and ones which the actuality of living in postmodernity is forcing 
upon us whether we like it or not.2 These solutions suggest -  at least to me
— that we can now live p re /p o s t m odern lives in ways which have no need 
for any infinite fix to stabilise contingency and chance; no need for any upper 
case, m etanarrative history (or lower case professional/academ ic histories
— but that is another story)3 to stabilise time in a particular temporality, and 
no  n e e d  fo r a ca p ita lise d  E thics -  an E th ical System -  to stabilise 
‘disinterestedly’ the ‘in terested’ tastes and styles of our own personal and 
public morality : that we can forget these sorts of history and ethics altogether.
To any rem aining non-sophists, this may seem to be a rash move to 
make, bu t my thinking on the non-rashness of it might seem less reckless if 
I briefly reform ulate some of what I have ju st said and so further prepare 
the ground for what all these preliminary remarks are actually leading up 
to; namely, an exam ination (expository much more than critical) of a text 
by Elizabeth Deeds Erm arth — Sequel to History : Postmodernism, and the Crisis 
of Representational Time4 — wherein she essays, in what I will argue is one of 
the m ost im portant considerations of postmodernism, history and eth ics/ 
morality available, what I construe as ways of living in time but outside history;
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
2 I am indebted  to Peter Brickley for convincing me that relativism was the solution to, 
and no t the problem  of, existence and morality; also to Philip Jenkins whose various 
argum ents on Baudrillard I have drawn on in passing.
3 See the In troduction  to my The Postmodernism History Reader, Routledge, London 
1997.
4 E. D. E rm arth, Sequel to History: Postmodernism and The Crisis of Representational Time, 
P rinceton University Press, Princeton 1992. Rather than footnoting my references to 
E rm arth, I have inserted them  paranthetically in the paper.
215
Keith Jenkins
in morality but outside ethics. My reform ulation o f our cu rren t condition -  
my further stage setting for Ermarth -  can be pu t as follows.
It still seems rather obvious and commonsensical to say that perhaps 
the main reason why historians study the past is because they think that what 
this work may produce -  a historical consciousness -  is a good thing. Yet 
beyond this minimalist intention com m on endeavour and agreem ent tend 
to collapse. For given that it is the idea of the good which defines the desired 
type of consciousness; that is to say, if a good historical consciousness is 
anything the definer so stipulates -  which it is -  then because ‘we’ live amongst 
so many com peting notions of the good with no universally accep tab le / 
neutral criteria for adjudication between them, so not only does any ultimate 
closure become endlessly deferred, bu t the very idea o f a good historical 
consciousness is similarly affected: we now have no clear sense of what a good 
h isto ry /h isto rica l consciousness is. T here  are  various con tem pora ry  
reactions to this ‘relativist’ conclusion, bu t perhaps the most popular is no t 
to try -  and keep on trying -  to find a ‘real’ history/historical consciousness 
beyond constitutive interests, but to adm it o n e ’s position (one’s interests) 
so to be as reflexive, ironic (après, say, Richard Rorty) and as ‘open about 
one’s closures’ as one can be. Thus we witness increasingly historians quite 
openly flagging their positions -  feminists and post-feminists, post-marxists, 
post-colonialists, neo-phenomenologists, neo-pragmatists, etc. — and, at the 
level of the lower case, um pteen ‘revisionists’. But my argum ent is that this 
positional explicitness is still ‘too historical’. For I think that we are now at 
a m om ent when we might forget history altogether and live our lives without 
reference back to a past tense articulated in ways which we are historically 
familiar with. Maybe we can forget the historicised past and -  because we 
do still have to (temporarily) live to g e th e r- ju s t talk about that : ethics talk. 
And yet, this alternative may also be, in turn, too ethical. Why can’t we forget 
ethics too?
Here, in distinguishing ethics from  morality, a little bit o f arbitrary 
defining (there is no other) may be useful. For the problem  with ethics is 
that normally we link up that notion with the idea o f a system : an ethical 
system. Such an idea of an ethical system -  say Kant’s -  has, at its centre, the 
further notion of universalism; that is, an ethical system is one which, if 
universalised, would allow ethicaljudgem ents to be made about all and every 
contingent situation when one has to make a choice -  when one has to decide 
what one ought to do. But such a to ta l, tra n sc en d e n ta l system is an 
impossibility and, in the event that this should be held not to be so, actually 
not ethical anyway. For if there was such a thing as a total ethic so that in 
every situation one only had to apply it, then one would not be m aking a
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choice at all bu t merely applying a rule -  in which case the implementation 
o f  such a ru le  absolves the  subject from  actually m aking a decision. 
Consequently, there  is no morality (choice) involved here, but ju st the 
application of a necessity. But if, as I am assuming, morality involves choice 
in such a way that a system o f ‘ethical necessities’ would not be moral at all, 
then free choice, untram alled by reference back to any ‘system’, wouldjust 
have to be subjective, contingent, situationist, pragmatic, aleatory, and thus 
always ultimately unsystematizable and ungroundable, ie., sophist-like. It is 
th is s itu a tio n , the  s itu a tio n  w here every m oral cho ice  is u ltim ately  
undecidable (the aporia) bu t where decisions always have to be made, which 
makes D errida talk about the ‘madness of the decision’, Baudrillard the 
‘radical illusion of morality’, Levinas the ontological violence inflicted on 
the o ther to make it the same, and Laclau talk about the ‘philosophy of the 
undecidability of the decision’.5 The upshot of all this -  to cut a long story 
very short -  is that we are now all left within an unbounded space-time, with 
no th ing  certaintist to fall back on to underwrite our public/private self­
styling, and with no fixed horizons (common skies) to guide us...with no 
ultim ate ethical stabilisers....least of all any stabilisers we may have thought 
issued from  a past constructed historiographically by us but in such a way so 
to render forth the illusion that that past/history was self-constituting so to 
help us live better lives, the (historicised) past as the great pedagogue, always 
teaching us ‘its’ lessons as i f  they were not always only our own projections. 
Consequently, that illusion now transparently obvious, so the suggestion that 
we ‘forget history and ethics’ for ‘temporality and morality’, postist/sophist- 
style, now forces itself upon us -  or rather -  we now force it upon ourselves.
As already suggested, Ermarth addresses both facets of the postmodern 
condition I have been discussing; to recall, the question of what would it be 
like to live out o f history bu t in time; out o f  ethics but in morality. As I read 
her, I think that she is m uch more successful arguing for the form er rather 
than the latter, where she seems to perhaps not fully recognise the problems 
or, if she does, to be insufficiently relativist about them, needlessly drawing 
back from where I take the logic of her argum ent to be driving her. But I 
retu rn  to this criticism after my reading of Erm arth’s text which, it must be 
reiterated, has a richness and suggestiveness which defies easy summary and 
which I urge readers to go to and appropriate for their own purposes, as I 
have done here. Relative to the above stage setting, then, my own take own 
on (just aspects of) Erm arth runs as follows.
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
5 See the various argum ents o f Rorty, Derrida, Lyotard, Laclau, et al, in C. Mouffe 
(ed .), Deconstruction and Pragmatism, Routledge, London 1996.
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Let us stipulate, as metaphysics, the giveness of existence (the gift o f the 
world, being) as something which ju st existentially is (I mean, we d o n ’t have 
a choice about unconditionally accepting these gifts). And let us say that 
this given, this thing-in-itself, is actually eternally unfathom able. T hen let 
us stipulate ontology as the effort to bring this given within the closure of 
meaning, to very precisely try to make it fathom able and  known (episte­
mological). Let us go on to say that this restriction, once on-going, then 
performs that constant (violent) appropriation by which we seek to enlarge 
our meanings until the metaphysical is exhausted and ‘its’ m eaning reduced 
to ‘ours’; its ‘otherness’ now ‘corresponding’ to the ‘sam e’: to us. T hen let 
us say that, of course, this attempted closure can never fully occur; that what 
Bataille calls the ‘general economy’ of existence resists our most persistant 
cultural drives towards the production of m eaning and the grounding of 
such m eaning (the attem pt to eliminate the excess) within our ‘restrictive’ 
productionist economy. And then let us recognise this struggle between the 
metaphysical and the ontological/epistemological -  between the unrestricted 
(infinite) general economy and the restrictivist productive one -  constitutes 
at one and the same time both the possibility of m eaning and the guarantee 
that a full m eaning (total presence, self-identity, etc.) is unachievable; that 
the gap between the thing-in-itself (the other, radical alterity etc.) and our 
theoretical appropriations of it remain, no m atter how apparently close (d ), 
infinitely and  eternally apart...but that ‘the rhetorical beat m ust go on, 
endlessly repeating  the sequence by which the lure o f solid g round  is 
succeeded by the ensuing demystification.’6
Now, all this can be read as simply saying that, in a culture, ‘no th ing  is 
of a natural kind.’ Everything to be m eaningful and productive has to be 
within the ‘productivist economy’, its excess cordoned off and kept on the 
outside (from  there to haun t it...haunt it with the though t o f its always 
imperfect closures), an economy which, to be comm unicable, is necessarily 
coded. Accordingly, to be in a culture is to live in and through a code, a 
language, to be w ithin the (th eo re tica l) im aginaries (m etaphysical, 
ontological, epistemological) which constitute reality (the ‘effects of the real’) 
so that ‘residence in a language’ «residence in reality (the real is imaginary, 
the imaginary is real), this including, o f course, that metaphysical imagining 
of what, theoretically outside of the productivist economy, the excess may 
be like (ie, the excess isn’t any more ‘really rea l’ than the cultural inside, 
it’sjust a regulative idea, a potentially productive silence; another simulacra).
6 S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, Oxford University Press, O xford 1989, p. 493.
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T he imaginary which Erm arth is most interested in is the discursive 
p roduction  o f W estern time. We don ’t know what the stuff we call time 
actually is; time, to be ‘tim e’, always has to be timed (given temporality). 
And it is the peculiar way in which Western time has been timed in what 
Erm arth calls its m odern, linear, historical form (which she traces back to 
at least as far as the Renaissance), the capsizal of that (arbitrary) form in 
‘postm odern times’, and its replacem ent by a timing o f time that is precisely 
n o t ‘historical’ bu t is rather conceived in feminist friendly, chaos friendly, 
hopscotch, figurai, rhythmic timings, that is the concern of her text.
E rm arth is of the opinion that postmodernism has just about got all 
the imaginary form ulations needed to end m odern linear history and begin 
rhythmic time, and she’s glad. For whereas modernist discourse has got used 
to its im agining of time so to regard it as ‘real time’ -  has forgotten its in­
ventedness (its tem poral fix) so regarding it as a neutral, objective pheno­
m enon -  postm odernism  urges us to recall that such a reality is always the 
‘mediated construct of a founding subject’; that time is a function of position, 
(p. 18) For Ermarth, ‘objects’, including phenomenal timings, are best seem 
no t as ‘objectively’ there but rather as the ‘subject objectified’ or, better still, 
as the ‘subject performatively objectifying’ from specific enunciative locations 
(the ‘locutions of cu lture’), this latter construal giving impetus to the move 
away from a fixed Cartesian ego/subject in favour of a subject-in-process, 
perform atively and playfully constituting then living within such consti­
tutiveness whilst interminably unsettling such temporary shelters/residences 
seen now as old m etaphors congealed into the appearances of literal truths 
and awaiting dissolution by new, more pragmatically useful ones (‘the beat 
goes on...’) , ones opening up -  as Ermarth construes postmodern potentiality
-  erotic possibilities. These possibilities, not being within the restricted 
econom y of linear history, thus effectively draw on the (m etaphorical) 
resources o f the general economy, the metaphysical excess, it being the 
(counter) pene tra tion  o f tha t excess, im agined by Erm arth as feminist 
friendly, rhythm ic time, in to  the male (phallologocentric) productivist 
historical economy, that potentially destabilises it, this explaining, not least, 
the opposition, fear and indeed intense hatred postmodernism often en­
genders am ongst m o d e rn is ts /’h isto rians’. For E rm arth , postm odern  
rhythmic critiques of modernist linear histories involve a critique of everything 
within the m oribund productivist, modernist economy:
W h a t p o s tm o d e rn is m  su p p la n ts ,  th e n , is th e  d isc o u rse  o f  r e p r e ­
sen ta tio n  characteristic  o f  th e  long  and  productive e ra  th a t p roduced  
h isto rical th ink ing ... Across a b road  range o f cultural m anifestations a 
massive re-exam ination  o f  W estern discourse is underway: its obsession
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
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w ith pow er an d  know ledge , its c o n s tra in t  o f  la n g u a g e  to  p rim a rily  
sym bolic fu n ctio n , its e th ic  o f  w in n in g , its ca te g o ric a l a n d  d u alis tic  
m odes o f  definition; its belief in  the  quan tative  an d  objective, its lin e a r  
tim e  a n d  in d iv id u a l su b je c t, a n d  ab o v e  a ll its  c o m m o n  m e d ia  o f  
exchange (tim e, space, m oney) w hich g u ara n tee  ce rta in  po litica l an d  
soc ia l sy stem s...T h ere  a re  som e w ho fe a r  th a t  p o s tm o d e rn is m , by 
d ep rec ia ting  trad itional causalities, p o rte n d s  an  e n d  to  m orality  itself 
[Ethics] an d  the  fea r is n o t u n fo u n d e d  so fa r as tra d itio n a l m orality  
[Ethics] is co n cern ed , (pp . 5-9).
Unlike so many postm odern historians, then , who, as I have no ted  
already, see postmodernism as the beginning of new kinds o f history (post­
feminist, post-colonial, etc.) Ermarth isn’t interested in in terpreting the past 
‘rhythmically’, rather she sees it as offering a present and a fu ture w ithout 
history ‘as we know it’ but with a new type of existential temporality. At times 
she is guarded about this, ‘my in ten tion ’, she writes, ‘is n o t to lobby for 
postmodernism at the expense of history’, bu t to locate ‘a m ajor discursive 
shift in ou r understand ing  of tem porality  an d  to exp lo re  som e o f its 
implications’, (p. 10) Again she writes: ‘W hether or no t it is m eaningful to 
speak o f a “new” history rem ains an open  question, a lthough  the term  
“history” has become so saturated with dialectical value that it may no longer 
be very bouyant...I attend mainly to how postm odern narrative time works, 
what it offers, and what its implicit requirem ents, gains, and losses may be. 
The work that underm ines history also opens new questions and provides 
new oppo rtun ities  in p rac tice .’ (pp. 14-15). B ut these (unnecessary) 
qualifications noted -  these bits of m odernist nostalgia which will resurface 
in her hesitation over accepting the relativising logic of her position — on 
the whole Ermarth is up-beat:
My thesis in b rie f is this: p o stm o d ern  narra tive  language u n d e rm in e s  
h istorical tim e an d  substitutes fo r it is a new  co n stru c tio n  o f  tem porality  
th a t I call rhythm ic tim e. This rhy thm ic tim e e ith e r  radically m odifies 
o r abandons a ltogether the dialectics, th e  teleology, th e  tran scen d en ce  
[the in fin ite  fix] an d  the  putative n eu tra lity  o f  h isto rical tim e; a n d  it 
r e p la c e s  th e  C a rte s ia n  cogito w ith  a  d i f f e r e n t  su b je c tiv ity  w h o se  
m anifesto  m ight be C ortazar’s “I swing, th e re fo re  I am .” (p. 14).
Against this general thesis, then, E rm arth’s text is com posed of a series 
of densely elaborated arguments which, ironically, have the overall form  of 
an old binary opposition. Erm arth’s text is basically structured around the 
attempt to show (a) what is wrong with m odern (ist) linear, phallologocentric 
history and (b) what is right with rhythmic time and what are its possibilities.
E rm arth’s accusations against ‘history’ add up to a catalogue o f faults 
th a t is heavy indeed . M odern ist h isto rica l seq u en c in g , p a tte rn in g , 
rationalising and ‘accounting for’, converts chance into causality and, often,
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into dem anding necessities that justify sometime ends-mean scenarios of a 
totalising, totalitarian kind. Tamers of the contingent and the ludic, their 
(generally) narrative encased accounts function to make us feel at home in 
the existential giveness in the way that ‘legends always have, as collective 
myths that confirm  various primary “truths” about “the way things are”’. 
B e lie f in  a te m p o ra l m ed iu m  th a t is ‘d isin terested ly  n a tu ra l’ and  
hom ogeneous consequently  makes possible those mutually informative 
m easurem ents between one historical m om ent and another that support 
m ost form s o f know ledge so that ‘History has becom e a com m anding 
m etanarrative, perhaps the metanarrative in Western discourse.’ (p. 20) It 
is here, in narrative/m etanarrative that the mythical figures of ‘historical 
objectivity’ and  ‘true m ean ing’ appear, articulated typically through the 
disinterested narrator/om niscient narrator, ‘the Narrator as Nobody’, issuing 
forth  the illusion o f ‘History Speaking’. This achievement -  of naturalising 
the imaginaries o f realistic time and space and of a commonly recognised 
set of continuities and of neutrality -  enable ‘us’ to ‘arrive a t’ our hypotheses, 
fo rm ula te  o u r laws, p roduce  our experm im ents, ‘ou r capital and ou r 
knowledge’, so producing ‘an invariant world’. Here, any dissenting voices, 
any excessive interpretive play, are marginalised as pathological: it is only 
the ‘accidents’ o f language, nationality, gender and ideology, that obscure 
‘objective t r u th ’ and  a poten tially  ‘cosmic vision’. These conditions 
notwithstanding, ‘if each individual could see all the world...all would see 
the same world...in this, perhaps, tem poral realism or history betrays its 
religious origin.’ (p. 30). And this tendency to go cosmic, to universalise, 
is political:
Considered historically the present requires a future to complete or 
at least improve it, and consequently a dialectical method for getting 
there just as this same present has been producal dialectically by the 
past. By emphasising what is linear, developmental, and mediate, 
historical thinking by definition involves transcendence of a kind that 
trivialises the specific detail and finite moment. In the mobile culture 
of historicism every moment has to be partial so that we can pursue 
development, so we can seek a completion that, by definition and 
paradoxically, we can never actually find but that has emblems along 
the way: more information, more clarity, more money, more prestige, 
more of the constituents of heaven (p. 31).
And, o f course, such destinations, heavily Western and heavily male 
orientated, have just about excluded nine-tenths of the world, a fraction which 
includes most women. Consequently it is this ‘fact’, the exclusion of this 
fraction from history, that makes Erm arth’s discarding o f history not only
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
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one to be at ease with but a necessary one : ‘Is it possible to exist outside 
history? [Yes] Women know; they have existed th ere ’, (p. 17).
For those precisely excluded by the W estern myth o f history, post­
modernism thus ushers in, in its potentially new timings, potentially new 
emancipations. Unlike historical em ancipations -  always then  no t now, 
always there not here -  postm odern em ancipatory im aginaries are ‘pre- 
sentist’. Thus postmodernism,
calls o u r  atten tion  not to fictions o f  orig ins an d  ends b u t to  th e  process 
o f consciousness itself as it construc ts  a n d  d ec o n stru c ts  such  fic tions 
and , m ost im portantly, as it enables readers  to  p e rfo rm  those  new  acts 
o f a tten tio n  req u ired  by a w riting [an d  a p rac tice . ..for to  b e  in  language 
is to  be in  ‘reality’] th a t is going n ow here  because it has already  arrived.
(p. 86).
As opposed to the heavy seriousness of history, then postm odern timings 
are altogether lighter and more bearable by comparison. Accordingly the 
bulk of Erm arth’s text is taken up with the general possibilities of residing 
in a postmodern language/practice and, more particularly, of the possibilities 
for women: the benefits seem enormous.
As I read her, Erm arth’s positive argum ents start from  the same sort of 
assumptions that I briefly alluded to in my preparatory rem arks; namely, 
that the world (and the world gone by) is neither significant or absurd: it 
just is. We kid ourselves if we think that through our ‘scripture, literature, 
picture, sculpture, agriculture, pisciculture, all the tures in this world’, we’ve 
ever really got it taped, (p. 98). The world, the past, existence, rem ain 
utterly problem atic, and exhileratingly so : ‘All o u r lite ra tu re  has n o t 
succeeded in eroding their smallest corner, in flattening their slightest curve.’ 
(p. 97). For it is this sublime otherness which ‘springs up before us’ in those 
‘exciting moments of danger’ when the covers are blown. The point here is 
not simply that this destroys habitual practices, the point is now to make ‘a 
deliberate action of what has heretofore been automatic, a political agenda’, 
(p. 99). Such an agenda will retain its m etaphorical status upfront; if we 
can never know literally what the world is ‘in itself, then our appropriations 
of it are always metaphorical, rhetorical: the past as i f  it was history. Yet -  
and I return  to Erm arth’s failure to happily accept any m etaphors -  no t any 
old imaginary will do for her. After clearing the decks, a specific agenda 
which on occasion seems to suggest that it is itself a necessity (given the way 
the world actually is) is outlined. H ere is a bit m ore o f the deck clearing:
T he m ost subversive theory  is the o n e  th a t resists th e  h ab it o f  W estern 
know ledge  to  to ta lise , to  go fo r  f irs t  a n d  f in a l cau se . In  W este rn  
epistemology, fo r exam ple, the stru c tu re  o f  in d u c tio n  an d  deduc tion ... 
im plies th a t theo ry  m ust som ehow  b e  a d e q u a te  to  p rac tice , o r  th a t
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prac tice  m ust con fo rm  to theory. T he postm odern  idea o f theory  as a 
g u errilla  tactic - if  you h av en ’t got one m ake one up - flies in  the face o f 
th is .. .c e n tu r ie s -o ld  d iscu rs iv e  h a b it. T h e  p ra c tic e  o f  p o s tm o d e rn  
theory., .requires a  fine sense o f play and  a total willingness to live w ithout 
d iscursive s le e p ...(p . 99).
So, what does playing guerilla with Ermarth theoretically entail; how 
does she carve out of an indifferent time a feminist friendly temporality? 
Put skeletally, I would portray Erm arth’s near two-hundred page celebration 
in the following two or three page way.
Rhythmic time is her favourite trope. As opposed to modernist history/ 
’tellable’ time, rhythm ic time has no time for transcendence : it has no 
essences, no universals, no immanence; no point. Rather rhythmic time -  
parataxis on the move -  depends on local arrangem ents whose ‘ampli­
fications’ are unpredictab le. Rhythmic sequences fork and re-fork, ex­
foliating, proliferating them atic threads which come to arbitrary ends, a 
chaotic com ing together of ‘details patterned paratactically, which is to say, 
asyntactically, which is to say m eaninglessly’; details are unexpectedly 
complex and rich without becoming ‘information’. This way of reading the 
world is essential equipm ent for a postmodern at ease with herself. Ermarth 
elaborates:
T h e...p ara tac tic  moves forw ard by m oving sideways. Em phasising what 
is para lle l an d  synchronically  pa tte rn ed  ra th e r  than  w hat is linear and 
progressive ...P aratactic narrative [and lives] m ove...in several directions 
a t once. (p. 85).
Such stylistic self-fashioning (to reside in a language is to reside in 
‘reality’) offers new discursive practices, multi-level thinking which makes 
available m ultiple beginnings and endings; which pluralises perspectives, 
mixes and remixes, dubs and redubs those interpretive frames that subjects- 
in-process live through so as to make the past -  including those causal powers 
which have blindly impressed thus far her behavings, bear her impress: to 
be free of the ‘burden  of history’ is the aim: to be in control of her own 
discourse, to be a happy cronopios (p. 35) (Erm arth’s text is dedicated ‘to 
cronopios everywhere’) , who, refusing histories of infinity and dialectics, face 
w ith jo y  f in ite  lives. P ostm o d ern  tim e is thus c ronop io s  tim e : i t ’s 
performative, it’s improvisation, it’s individual and collective, it’s bricolage, 
it’s jazz. Forget the ‘conditionings’ of history; make the event.
Drawing on the semiotic dispositions of language (after Kristeva) and 
coupling it with Derrida’s notion of the endlessly ludic character of language 
(and thus life...), Erm arth extols the possibilities of that play which, in its 
endless deferm ents, prevents systems ever becoming closed. It is this sort of
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
223
Keith Jenkins
play that ruptures m odernist history, dependen t as it was/is on ontological 
axioms to keep the system secure and safe from  the (fem inine) excess:
D errid a’s a rgum ent has the im plications th a t structure itself is referential 
in  th e  se n se  th a t  i t  always d e p e n d s  fo r  its  s ta b ili ty  o n  r e f e r e n c e  
elsew here to som e justifying absolute th a t exists ‘b ey o n d ’ th e  s tru c tu re  
a n d  ex c ee d s  it. I t  is this referentiality to  a n  E lse w h e re  - to  a ‘fu ll 
p resen ce’...that validates the s truc tu re  an d  justifies its effo rt to  achieve 
m a x im u m  rig id ity  or... c o m p le ten e ss . By r e fe re n c e  to  s o m e th in g  
outside it... ’t ru th ’ o r  ‘natu ra l law’ o r  ‘reality ’ o r  ...’h is to ry ’ - s tru c tu re  
d epends on som eth ing ...that lim its absolutely its play o f  d iffe ren tia tion . 
H ow ever, to  th e  e x te n t  th a t  a s t r u c tu r e  lim its  p la y .. .i t  b e c o m e s  
‘ru in e d ’...no new form ulations, n o  new  ex p e rim en ts  o r  adven tu res a re  
possible. By contrast, the incom pleteness o f  living systems guaran tees... 
play rem ains open...system s th a t seek to  exc lude play are  also seek ing  
dea th , (p. 148).
Erm arth is seeking life. Utilising the concept o f the figure {figura) 
Ermarth hints at a future of play where meanings rem ain open. Events may 
be congruent but they don ’t necessarily connect, may be adjacent bu t no t 
related, may be sequenced but are not synthesisable. Things ju st d o n ’t add 
up, they are not aggregatable; no dialectical closure is possible. Postm odern 
figures -  temporary meanings in a chaos that makes such m eanings self- 
referentially meaningful, makes uniquivocal truths, meanings and purposes, 
non-permanent:
This d isorien tation  fo r its own sake is very un like  th e  effect o f  m edieval 
figura, w hich m akes tru th  only tem p o rarily  inaccessib le ...P ostm odern  
figure m akes univocal tru th  p e rm a n en tly  inaccessib le. O n  th e  ‘o th e r  
side’ o f  a m edievel figure is a  clarifiable s tru c tu re  an d  a stable, cosm ic 
m eaning . O n th e  ‘o th e r  side’ o f  p o s tm o d ern  figures is th e  m arvellous 
mystery consisting o f the fact th a t these  figures are the  tang ib le  w orld, 
an d  th a t the tangib le w ord is d iscourse, is language , is f ig u re ...T h e re  
are n o  m essages...only m essengers, (p. 184).
It is this endless play of a ‘meaningful m eaninglessness’ — being on the 
edge of the abyss but not regarding this as abysmal - that arouses eroticism. 
Not, Ermarth hastens to add, eroticism in the ‘narrow, shabby sense’, bu t 
in the sense o f having the capacity to surprise -  forever. This is subversive. 
In a productive culture which lives in the linear, the purposeful, then play 
conjures up notions of waste : of wasting time, squandering, o f time mis­
spent. Digressive, paratactic play defying dialetics, however, confers for 
E rm arth  ‘an exquisite p leasure  by re liev ing  the  m ind  o f its a lready  
recognisable...meanings...To restore to language its electricity...its power to 
shock, to derail it from the track of convential formulas’, is to be postmodern. 
This isn’t easy. It involves a capability for the kinds o f play ‘no t currently
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prim ary values of the cultural formation in which we presently operate our 
universities, watch our markets, and pursue our careers.’ But it can be done: 
‘Once we have given up antidotes to finitude -  Kantian categories and vodka 
-w e  face finitude and its opportunities.’ (p. 193).
This challenge to history, to the closure of systems, to live a life that is 
alive ra ther than a living death, this is what makes rhythmic, ludic time, the 
future Erm arth wants : for this you can forget history and (I think) systems 
perse - including Ethical ones:
T his m a n eu v e r o f  im a g in a tio n  in  play in  language [in a life] is on e  
th a t does w ithou t history, w ithout a m illenary kingdom , w ithout K antian 
categories o r  vodka, w ithou t Marx, F reud , o r ‘all the religions d ream t 
u p  by m a n ’...In  th e ir  p lace this p ostm odern  w riting [living] offers its 
p rec is io n , its e ro tic  (ch a n ce) con junctions, its rhy thm ic  series : the  
c o lo u re d  b its  o r  e le m e n ts  o f  k a le id o s c o p ic  a r r a n g e m e n ts ,  a n d  
w hatever p a tte rn s  em erge. T hese are the m aterials fo r  the  an them atic  
f igure , a m andala , a polychrom ous rose design, a rhythm ic, m om entary, 
flee ting , life-affirm ing arran g em en t. Trying to give these arran g em en t 
fixity, o r  to  c o n tro l th is rh y th m  in advance, w ould b e  like try ing  to  
re d ire c t th e  arrow  afte r it has left the bow. (p. 210).
This essaying of existential-type, postm odern possibilities after the end 
of history seems exhilarating; if nothing else Erm arth’s optimism displaces 
those more common, mournful musings on the loss of one of the West’s most 
potent, organising mythologisations -  history -  articulated not least by those 
who have most to lose. It may therefore appear churlish to now level against 
E rm arth’s ‘visions’ some concluding criticisms, thereby rem aining trapped 
within the ritualistic (modernist) convention of the expositor turning critic 
as he or she -  having lived parasitically off the text -  has the ‘correcting’ last 
word. But I ‘in ten d ’ my criticisms to be constructive. It seems to me that 
E rm arth  succeeds in  h e r  c ritiq u e  o f m o d ern ity ’s way of o rgan ising  
temporality -  linear history -  such that it is indeed possible to conceive of a 
life without it; to live outside that history and within a new rhymic temporality 
where ‘history as we have known it’ has no more relevance; is passe. This 
signals the end  of history as modernists have conceptualised the past and 
thought they had ‘known it’. But - and this is my ‘but’ - 1 think that it is also 
possible to live outside of Ethics (Ethical systems) and in the type of morality 
suggested by Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Rorty, Fish et al, namely, that 
o f the ‘undecidibility  o f the decision’, the force o f which suggests the 
acceptance of a pragmatic, sophist-type relativism. For I think that Ermarth, 
despite the drift of her argument, draws back from this; in the end her notion 
of rhythmic time has the ring of truth about it.
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At various points throughout her text, then, Erm arth draws back from 
embracing the relativism which I think her argum ents propel her towards. 
Thus, for example, whilst insisting that there is nothing outside of language 
(the text, simulacra) such that ‘no th ing  exceeds its practices o r its play, 
nothing escapes its limitations, nothing acts as a cosmic or natural “ground” 
andjustification’ including, obviously, the linguistically constructed concept 
of time (including, obviously, rhythmic temporality) this fact, she adds, this 
recognition,’ is quite far removed from any relativist catastrophe’, (p. 140) 
Again, in relation to the historicised past, whilst the idea that the past is 
invented ‘threatens the moral universe with total solipsism’, the reader/w riter 
of the past, no more than the reader/w riter of any text, cannot do what h e /  
she likes with it; in fact, its existence demands a ‘disciplined’ reading/w riting 
because it -  texts and the past as a text -  ‘requires new acts of a tten tion .’ 
(pp. 71-2) Postmodernism, whatever else it is, she warns, is no t some sort 
o f cultural and moral bonfire.
Now, one of the reasons why Erm arth seems to be saying these things 
is something which suggest that she is still within the grip of the W estern 
Tradition where relativism is seen -  and this goes back to my com m ents at 
the start of this paper -  not as the sophist-like solution to the problem s of 
living in an indifferent world, but as a problem  still to be solved (hence her 
com m ent, above, wherein relativism is seen no t as a happy solution but 
rather as a ‘catastrophe’). W hat E rm arth  seems to be seeking is a nice 
consensus around the erotic possibilities of postm odernism  (basically one 
where everyone imagines reality as she does) for without ‘consensus available 
as a basis for conducting affairs, what is there but force?’ (p. 61). This is a 
fear which has standing behind  it that typical ‘m odern ist’ objection to 
postm odern relativism; namely, that such a relativism leaves us helpless 
before another holocaust:
Practically speaking, the debates ab o u t postm odern ism  com e dow n to 
discussion abou t what, if anything, provides a  reality  p rin c ip le  fo r any 
construct. P ostm odern  writers an d  theorists do  n o t deny  the  existence 
o f the  m aterial world...nor, so far as I know, does anyone fam iliar w ith 
the  issue seriously deny  th e  exclusiveness o f  d iscursive lan g u ag es to  
which we necessarily reso rt in  o rd e r  to  say any th ing  ‘a b o u t’ e i th e r  the  
m a te r ia l o r th e  d iscu rs ive  w o rld s  - s ta te m e n ts  th a t  in e v ita b ly  a re  
in te rp re ta tio n s  and , consequently , a p re - in te rp re ta tio n  o f  an  ap rio ri 
fo rm u la tio n .  B u t if  d isc u rs iv e  ru le s  p ro v id e  u n tr a n s c e n d a b le  
c o n s tra in ts , w hat co n s tra in s  th e  d iscu rs iv e  ru les?  T h e  q u e s tio n  is 
h au n ted  by the  specters o f holocausts w hich, in various n a tio n a l form s, 
have already dem onstra ted  w hat appears to  be no  restra in t. If  any th ing  
can  be ju s tif ie d  in som e N am e, is th e re  n o  way to  ch o o se  b e tw e en  
justifications? If every in te rp re ta tio n , every system, every set o f  laws is
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a c lo sed , in e r t ia l  system  a n d  if th e re  is n o  lo n g e r  valid ity  fo r  any 
priv ileged  position ...how  can  a person  o r  polis choose betw een....th is 
o r  th a t course ex cep t by chance? (p. 59).
Well, chance may, Erm arth allows, have much to do with it, and she 
will go on to consider surrealist pronouncem ents in favour of ‘objective 
chance’ (basically choosing between things once such things have been put 
‘under a description’) , but, leaving that aside in this paper (as Ermarth herself 
does at this point in her text) I want to concentrate, as she does, as to whether 
there are any general grounds for constraint. Here, Ermarth reviews and 
rejects ‘answers’ given by, variously, Rorty, Jam eson, Lyotard, Katherine 
Hayes and Barbara H errnstein Smith, the reason for their failure seeming 
to lie in the fact that they d o n ’t com prehend the way postmodernism has 
changed our understanding of ‘reality’; like the concept of history, ‘reality’ 
doesn’t m ean what it used to. Classically, explains Ermarth, reality implied 
som ething stable and self-identical, but ‘physical reality’ (which non-idealist 
postm odernists do not doubt) has been redescribed in postm odern idioms 
by people like Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, whose treatment of reality 
as ‘chaos as a phase of o rd e r’ means ‘reality’ is in a ‘constant process of 
fundam ental redefinition, so that the term “fundam ental” does not even 
really apply.’ (p. 62) Consequently, to give up on ‘classical’ reality does 
no t m ean we give up on postm odern ‘chaotic’ notions of reality as things 
which actually constrain us :
T h e  fears o f  m oral ca tastrophe  th a t postm odernism  raises in som e are 
u sua lly  p o s ite d  o n  classical assu m p tio n s ...[B u t] n o b o d y  d en ies  th e  
p re s e n c e  o f  c o n d it io n s  e x te rn a l to  o u r  d esc rip tiv e  a n d  lin g u is tic  
systems, n o b o d y  h o p es  fo r  com plete  solipsism  o f th e  k ind  th a t som e 
ascribe, com pletely  w rongheadedly, to postm odern ism  an d  th a t would 
in  any case only b e  possible in  a classical system...To give up  the ‘reality’ 
o r ‘rea litie s’ th a t constra in  behaviour and  inscribe value does n o t m ean 
an a rch ic  [sic] relativism  in which ‘everything is p e rm itte d ’ an d  b ru te  
p ow er ru le s ...T h e  fa ilu re  o f  a to ta lis ing  abso lu te  like h isto rical tim e 
m ay raise th e  fea r [sic] th a t ‘everything is p e rm itted ’ b u t...th e re  is no 
such  th in g  [as th a t] , (p. 62).
Rather, the chaos theory and the ‘dissipative structures’ described by 
Prigogine and Stengers introduce us to a ‘new concept of m atter’ that suggest 
a ‘new conception of order that is independent of the closures and finalities 
o f classical dynamics and that perm it us to see how “nonequilibrium brings 
order out of chaos”.' (p. 63) Thus, for example, the elem ent of chance in a 
stochastic (probabilistic) process -  where an ‘en d ’ becomes the possibility 
o f a new ‘beginning’ which is not controlled in the classical sense by that 
‘e n d ’ -  opens up new sources of life, new rhythms of continuance in ever-
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new states and modes: ‘The more determ inist laws appear limited, the more 
open the universe is to fluctuation and innovation.’ (p. 63). W ithout wanting, 
as Erm arth puts it, to draw ‘facile political analogies’ from Prigogine and 
Stenger, this is what she does indeed  go on to draw. In a probabalistic 
process, she argues, things must be considered in the context of the m om ent 
when individual behaviour can be decisive or ineffectual but no t predictable:
Even small fluctuations may grow an d  change  th e  overall s tru c tu re . As 
a re su lt ind iv idual activity is n o t d o o m e d  to  in sig n ifican ce . O n  th e  
o th e r  hand , this is also a th rea t [sic] since in  o u r  un iverse th e  security  
o f stab le , p e rm a n e n t ru les seem s g o n e  forever. W hat social ( th a t is, 
m oral) im plications this may have rem ains to  be seen , b u t it is n o t c lear 
tha t th e re  is any greater th rea t o f m oral ca tastrophe [sic] in probabalistic 
social descrip tions th a n  has already  b e e n  show n in  lo g o cen tric  ones.
(p. 65).
Postmodernism thus acknowledges not single but multiple constraints; 
postm odern time and space are warped and finite by ‘the play o f chance 
and necessity in the processes of life themselves...’’Reality”...never stays “the 
same”; it is no t inert but interactive...This awareness o f finitude, o f limit, is 
the basis of an entirely new aesthetic and provides the m ain restrain t on 
construction that postmodernism respects’, (pp. 65-6).
Now, this seems to me to be a most peculiar argum ent. O ne can see 
why Ermarth is running it, of course, probabalistic/chaos theory seems to 
be another way of talking about rhythmic time. But whilst this certainly 
undercuts ‘classical’ moral foundations (ie the ‘chance’ to draw a stable ought 
from a stable is) we Rorties and Lyotards have given up on trying to draw 
any entailed ought from any is, stable or unstable. I m ean, let us say the 
‘actual’ physical world is like Erm arth’s (moral) rhythmic description of it 
après Prigogine and Stenger. And say everyone accepts this : liberals, 
marxists, feminists, neo-nazis; everyone. W hat difference would it make? 
Is a political, constrained consensus between Erm arth and neo-nazis going 
to be arrived at because the way an (indifferent) world is in terms of physics? 
This seems unlikely, not least because, irrespective of physics, their moral 
differences remain incommensurable simply because they’re ‘m oral’ all the 
way down. Whilst views on the physical world may by chance affect politics 
it is difficult to see how they can determ ine them in any sort of is - ought way 
that involves entailm ent : Prigogine and Stengers are red  herrings in this 
respect.
There is another point here too with regard to closure. For it looks as 
if Ermarth, in following Prigogine and Stengers, is saying that chaos theory / 
rhythmic time are somehow closer to the way ‘reality’ actually is than other 
m etaphoric ‘correspondences’ are. But surely she can ’t be saying that.
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Because if she is, her notion of rhythmic time as being nearer to actuality 
and  therefore  the best (true) basis for a life better than old modernist, 
h istorical life, is ju s t as m uch a closure, albeit of a different substantive 
‘con ten t’, as the historical was. I mean, what if we d o n ’t want to embrace 
rhythmic time even if it can be shown to be nearer to actuality, to ‘nature’; 
what if we d o n ’t want to embrace a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ but want to retain 
our freedom  to choose; to choose, say, a newly constructed, emancipatory 
linearity? If Erm arth is being faithful to her own creative theorising, then 
presumably she ought not to care if anybody chooses to live non-rhythmically 
in non  feminist-friendly ways. Or is she saying that we ought to be rhythmic 
because  lin e a r  tim e is som ehow  in tr in s ic a lly  repressive, in tr in s ic a lly  
masculine; that rhythmic time is intrinsically feminist friendly, and that these 
connections cannot be reversed; that rhythmic time just cannot be repressive 
in its experim entations, as if from the activity of postm odern ‘play’ we 
cou ldn’t all end up temporarily playing neo-nazi? But what could stop this? 
Som ething in tr in sic  to ‘play’? It would seem that here Ermarth is simply 
substituting one closure (linear history) with another (rhythmic time) which 
we ought to follow because it is nearer actuality and thus, presumably, nearer 
to actualising em ancipation.
To be sure, Erm arth says she isn’t doing this. As she writes at the end 
o f h e r text (repeating  earlier, similar disclaimers), the ‘multilevel play 
described in this book belongs to an effort to renew social codes by restoring 
powers that have been repressed...not... to enforce another repression’, (p. 
212). But I think that she can only say this because she Änozwwhat is best for 
us and knows we won’t necessarily feel it as repression. Thus, for instance, 
seeing hum an beings as subjects-in-process just is a better way of seeing them 
as o p p o se d  to  see in g  them  in term s o f the C artesian  cogito; thus, 
postmodernism and feminism have an affinity because of theirjoint insistence 
that the ch ie f political problem s (of language...to have residence in a 
language is to have residence in ‘reality’) can ‘only [sic] be solved by writing 
a new language, one uncontam inated by the old, radioactive terms, so that 
one thing ‘seems certain : no effort to come to terms with social agendas will 
succeed w ithout the recognition that history itself is a representational 
construction of the first order, and that new social construction cannot [sic] 
take place un til history is d en a tu ra lised ’, (p. 56). These seem fairly 
certaintist, non-relativistic remarks to me, thus raising the question of how 
reflexive Erm arth has been about the status of the closures she is suggesting 
for others; I m ean, for a linearist to be trapped in rhythmic time could be 
a nightm are. But maybe Erm arth has thought of that; she admits a revision 
of existing hegom onic arrangem ents of the type she is suggesting may hurt.
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So alright. But arguably what isn’t alright is where she seems to forget that 
such new arrangements are nothing more than her own personal preferences, 
ungroundable in either chaos theory or ethics in any way whatsoever.
The reason for me saying this is because I think that this sort o f personal 
relativism is the only position postm odernism  makes available. This way of 
pu tting  things may make it look as if I ’m com m itting  a ‘perform ative 
contradiction’ (of saying that you must absolutely believe me when I say that 
the only truth is relativism which then appears to be an absolute truth, etc.) 
but I think this old ‘contradiction’ is no t a contradiction at all bu t a paradox 
and paradoxes, unlike contradictions, can be resolved. This particular one 
as of follows.
In the restricted, m odernist economy, it seem ed that symbolic value 
was based on use value, that there really were real intrinsic needs, capacities, 
meanings and so on, and these stabilized symbolic exchange mechanisms. 
In the postm odern (restricted) economy, however, having shed every last 
notion of intrinsic value (гме value) exchange takes place at the symbolic 
level only - at the level of the simulacra. Thus, unrestricted by use/in trinsic  
value, any symbolic value can be exchanged  with any o ther, in effect, 
‘anything goes’. Any-thing can be exchanged with any-thing else because 
things themselves (and certainly ‘things - in - themselves’) quite ‘literally’ 
d on ’t enter into it; any equivalence willl do. So, for example, you can, if 
you like, exchange love and justice for Erm arthian feminism (make them  
equivalent) or, staying with her allusion to the holocoust, exchange love and 
justice for it ( make them equivalent). Again, rhythmic time is equivalent 
to a type of liberation for Ermarth which for a non-Erm arthian m ight be 
equivalent to, as she puts it, a catastrophe. So which is it? Well, ‘it’ isnt 
either; ‘it’ isn’t anything until it is given a value, and any value can be given 
to anything. We may wish that this was no t the case, bu t it seems to me that 
it is.
From my point of view, then, I think it could be said that the transcendent 
has taken its revenge on Ermarth. O n the one hand it has allowed her to 
have her way with history - who knows or cares what it means any m ore - 
letting her concentrate on organising the future in desirable, rhythmic forms. 
But, on the other hand, Ermarth seems to have been seduced into thinking 
that there could be something in rhythmic time that isn’t just convenient for 
her own political desires but is actually closer to the way the world actually 
is, thus heading off relativism. But the idea ‘beh ind’ the notion of simulacra 
that we can know the gift of the world, etc., beyond endlessly interpretable 
mediations, is a radical illusion. A simulacra is not something which conceals 
the truth, it is the most plausible truth we have. Indeed, it is this ‘tru th ’
230
which hides die fact that there is no truth, so that in that sense we can say, 
paradoxically, that the simulacra is ‘true’. In The Perfect Crime"1, Baudrillard 
argues that whereas the old philosophical question used to be, ‘why is there 
som ething ra ther that nothing?’, the postm odern question is, ‘why is there 
noth ing  rather than som ething?’ The acceptance of the latter formulation 
suggests to B audrillard  (and  to me) that if we are bound  only to the 
in te rm in ab ly  u n s tab le  equivalencies o f signs and  appearances self- 
reverentially spinning around themselves (Baudrillards ‘orbital culture’) then 
relative value runs - forever. Yet, this is not a problem. For maybe we can 
relax about this and agree, with Wittgenstein, that the fact that there has 
never been the sorts of foundations we once thought there were (but that 
we hum ans have still created moral discourses) means that we never needed 
such foundations in the first place, nor will we, so that the very idea of 
foundationalism is ‘one well lost’. Besides, that absolutist conceit has caused 
too many problems -  not least those of the certaintist holocaust, that supreme 
modernist event.8 For as Richard Rorty has pointed out:
A n ti-p rag m atis ts  [a n d  an ti-p o stm o d e rn is ts  a n d  an ti-re lativ ists] foo l 
them se lves w hen  they  th in k  th a t by in s is tin g ...th a t m ora l tru th s  a re  
‘ob jective’ - are  tru e  in d e p e n d a n t o f hu m an  needs, in terests, history - 
they have prov ided  us with w eapons against the bad guys. For the fascists 
can , a n d  o ften  do , rep ly  th a t they en tire ly  agree th a t  m oral tru th  is 
objective, e te rn a l an d  universal... and  fascist...Dewey m ade m uch  o f  a 
fact th a t trad itional no tions o f ‘objectivity’ and  ‘universality’ were useful 
to th e  bad  guys, an d  h e  h ad  a po in t.9
This is no t to say, Rorty adds, that this inability to answer ‘the bad guys’, 
is the result of pragmatism or relativism being wicked or inadequate theories, 
bu t that philosophy is ju st no t the right weapon to reach for when trying to 
resolve, when all discursive attemps have failed, such moral and political 
differences. Thus, the inevitability of moral ‘philosophy of the decision’ 
relativism needn’t be any more of a problem for us that is was for the sophists, 
and it shou ldn’t be one for Ermarth. But I think it is. Yet, though arguably 
‘still in the grip of the trad ition’, Erm arth’s text is nevertheless one which 
enables us to imagine the possibility of living our lives not only outside history 
and in time, bu t outside ethics and in morality in quite self-conscious ways. 
For in fact, i f  only lue had known it, this is the ivay iue have always had to live our
Living in Time But Outside History, Living in Morality But Outside Ethics...
7 J. Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime, Verso, London 1996, p. 2.
8 On the holocaust as a m odernist event, and the problem of its representation see, for 
example, Hayden W hite’s, ‘The Modernist Event’, in V. Sobchack (ed.), The Persistance 
of History, Routledge, London 1996, pp. 17-38.
9 R. Rorty, ‘Just O ne More Species Doing Its Best’, London Review of Books, vol. 13, no. 
14, 25, July, 1991, pp. 3 - 7, p. 6.
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lives. In this respect - and it is in this respect that postm odern reflexivity is 
so useful - we might ju st as well relax and say, with Baudrillard: ‘“N othing” 
hasn’t changed.’
Keith Jenkins
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